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Abstract 
The climate-trade nexus gains increasing attention as governments are taking great efforts 
to forge a post-2012 climate change regime to succeed the Kyoto Protocol. This raises the 
issues of the scope of trade-related measures and of when and how they could be used. 
This paper discusses how far trade-related measures should be incorporated in that 
context. Drawing on an analogy to the Montreal Protocol and comparing developing 
country’s climate mitigation and adaptation needs with the funding available, the paper 
argues that such measures should initially be applied only among Annex I or II countries. 
To discipline the use of unilateral trade measures at the international level, the paper 
emphasizes a need to define comparable climate efforts. Moreover, the Lieberman-
Warner bill in the U.S. Senate - taken as a proxy for future U.S. climate legislation - is 
assessed, and found to be neither effective nor likely to be WTO-consistent. The paper is 
concluded by arguing that, in order to encourage developing countries to do more to 
combat climate change, developed countries should focus on carrots. Sticks can be 
incorporated, but only if they are credible and realistic and serve as a useful supplement 
to push developing countries to take actions or adopt policies and measures earlier than 
would otherwise have been the case. 
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I. Introduction 
There is a growing consensus that climate change has the potential to seriously damage 
our natural environment and affect the global economy and thus represents the world’s 
most pressing long-term threat to future prosperity and security. With greenhouse gas 
emissions embodied in virtually all products produced and traded in every conceivable 
economic sector, effectively addressing climate change will require a fundamental 
transformation of our economy and the ways energy is produced and used. This will 
certainly have a bearing on world trade because it will affect the costs of production of 
traded products and therefore their competitive positions in the world market. This 
climate-trade nexus has become the focus of an academic debate (e.g., Bhagwati and 
Mavroidis, 2007; Charnovitz, 2003; Hufbauer, Charnovitz and Kim, 2009; Ismer and 
Neuhoff, 2007; The World Bank, 2007; Zhang, 1998, 2004 and 2007a; Zhang and 
Assunção, 2004), and gains increasing attention as governments are taking great efforts to 
forge a post-2012 climate change regime to succeed the Kyoto Protocol. To level the 
carbon playing field, such a regime, if effective, will imperatively include the use of 
trade-related policy tools. The core element of that is trade-related measures in a post-
2012 climate change regime. This raises the issues of the scope of such measures and of 
when and how they could be used.  
 
To examine this issue, this paper first looks at the lesson learned from other multinational 
environmental agreements, such as the Montreal Protocol in which such trade provisions 
have been included to see what guidance can be provided. Next, the paper examines 
whether the condition can be met, provided that a post-2012 climate regime is to 
incorporate trade provisions as the Montreal Protocol does. The paper also interprets the 
findings of the WTO panels on the Thai cigarette dispute the Shrimp-Turtle dispute to 
infer future WTO panel’s stance on the use trade provisions being justified under the 
environmental exceptions of GATT Article XX. On these basis, the paper argues that 
while it is unlikely for developing country parties to agree to the inclusion of trade-
related measures in a post-2012 climate regime, trade-related measures should, at the 
very least, be contemplated for a set of industrialized countries (Annex I or II countries) 
as part of the evolving climate regime. It should be specified how these measures will 
apply to non-complying parties within this group and when and how unilateral trade 
measures can be used against countries outside the group. To that end, the paper 
emphasizes that there is a clear need to define comparable efforts towards climate 
mitigation and adaptation to discipline the use of unilateral trade measures at the 
international level, because some industrialized countries, if not all, are considering the 
term “comparable” as the standard by which to assess the efforts made by their trading 
partners in order to decide on whether to impose unilateral trade measures on them. 
Finally, the paper argues that the Lieberman-Warner type of border adjustment provision, 
in its current form, is likely to face a WTO-consistency and methodological challenges. It 
holds out more sticks than carrots to developing countries. In order to encourage 
developing countries to do more to combat climate change, developed countries should 
clearly focus on carrots. Although sticks can be incorporated, it is argued that they should 
be credible and realistic and serve as a useful supplement to push developing countries to 
take actions or adopt policies and measures earlier than would otherwise have been the 
case. The paper concludes that at a time when the world community is starting to 
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negotiate a post-2012 climate regime, unrealistic border adjustment measures as 
exemplified in the Lieberman-Warner bill are counterproductive to help to reach such an 
agreement on comparable climate actions in the post-2012 climate negotiations.  
 
 
2. Trade measures in the Montreal Protocol 
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (MP) was signed in 
1987 and has since been amended and strengthened in a number of aspects. The MP uses 
trade measures as one enforcement mechanism among several policy instruments in 
achieving its aim of protecting the ozone layer. Parties to the treaty are required to ban 
trading with non-parties in ozone-depleting substances (ODS), such as CFCs, in products 
containing them, such as refrigerators, and potentially, in products made with but not 
containing CFCs, such as electronic components. The last provision has not yet been 
implemented primarily because of problems of detection, and also because of the small 
volumes of CFCs involved. These trade measures have been gradually extended to all the 
categories of ozone-depleting substances covered by the MP. Moreover, the MP has 
included the provision that exempts non-parties from trade measures if they are 
determined by the parties to be in compliance with the phase-out schedules. So, the 
offsetting trade measures are based on legitimate environmental objective and not merely 
on formal membership of an international agreement (Brack, 1996; Zhang, 1998). 
 
More importantly, these trade measures are accompanied with finance and technology 
transfer mechanisms. Under the MP, the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the 
Montreal Protocol was established in 1990 to meet the incremental costs of developing 
country parties (the so-called Article 5 countries) in complying with the MP requirements. 
Since its operation in 1991, the Multilateral Fund has received contributions totaling over 
US$ 2.3 billion from 49 industrialized countries and supported about 5,700 projects and 
activities in 146 developing countries. The implementation of these projects will result in 
the phase-out of the consumption of more than 249,577 ODP tonnes and the production 
of about 174,206 tonnes of ozone depleting substances. As a result, developing countries 
are no worse off as parties than they are as non-parties. The MP is now 20-year old with 
191 Parties. It has achieved 95% of its objective of phasing out the ODS and put the 
ozone layer on a path to recovery.1 Accompanied with this effective financial mechanism, 
the first of its kind from an international treaty, the MP trade measures have in fact hardly 
ever been used, because almost every country is now a party to the treaty. 
 
 
3. Funding from the Climate Convention and its financial mechanism 
The lesson from the MP suggests that the funding level of finance mechanism is crucial if  
a post-2012 climate regime is to incorporate trade provisions as the Montreal Protocol 
does. The Kyoto Protocol (KP) establishes a clean development mechanism (CDM). It 
serves as a channel to provide finance and technology transfer to developing countries. 
The CDM has, in part, been successful. The global number of CDM projects registered 
                                                 
1 See the Multilateral Fund web site at: http://www.multilateralfund.org (accessed on 
August 29, 2008). 
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and in the pipeline totals over 4600 - well above what was envisioned by countries when 
they negotiated, designed and launched the mechanism (Zhang, 2009b). The CDM 
market increased from 563 million tons of certified emission reductions (CERs) and  €3.9 
billion in 2006 to 947 million tons of CERs and  €12 billion in 2007. The astonishing 
increase in value terms is due mainly to dramatic growth in the secondary market with 
about 300 million CERs traded over the course of 2007 (Point Carbon, 2008). While the 
CDM has emerged as a financing mechanism to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions as the 
implementation of CDM projects has progressed, it still does not work to full potential 
scale (IETA, 2008; Paulsson, 2009; Zhang, 2008a). To that end, change needs to take 
place both at national and international levels. At the national level, for those developing 
countries that have not truly benefited from the CDM, they need to put in place clear 
institutional structures, streamlined and transparent CDM procedures and sound 
governance of clearer lines of responsibility and functions to facilitate the smooth 
implementation of CDM projects in their countries. At the international level, post-Kyoto 
climate negotiations need to reform the CDM to overcome its current structural 
limitations and to make it accommodate those players and types of small projects that 
have been left out to date. When taken together and combined, they will help to expand 
the number and geographical reach of the CDM, thus spreading its benefits to more 
countries (Zhang, 2008a). Nevertheless, markets cannot deliver miracles. Market 
instruments like CDM, as useful as it may be, must therefore be complemented with 
traditional fund solutions that provide a stable source of funding.  
 
 
Table 1  The Amount of Pledges and Contributions from the Multilateral Financial 
Mechanisms under the Framework Convention and its Kyoto Protocol 
 
Sources Amount (million US$) 
Special Climate Change Fund 
Least Developed Countries Fund 
Adaptation Fund 
Global Environment Facility Trust Fund 
(allocated to climate change focal area)  
106.57 (pledged) 
172.44  (pledged) 
80-300 per year (estimated) 
 
950 (targeted for 2006-2010) 
 
Sources: Global Environment Facility (2008a); UNFCCC (2007). 
 
 
Can the funds established within the climate regime deliver as the Multilateral Fund 
under the MP did? The Special Climate Change Fund and the Least Developed Countries 
Fund are established under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). As of October 2, 2008, the total pledged for these two funds 
(cumulatively, not per year) is US$279 million (Table 1). The only fund under the KP is 
the Adaptation Fund. The level of its funding depends on the quantity of CERs issued and 
their prices. Assuming annual sales of 300-450 million tons of CERs and a market price 
of US$24 per ton of CERs, the Adaptation Fund would receive US$80-300 million per 
year for the period 2008-2012 (UNFCCC, 2007). The Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) as an entity operating the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC has targeted the 
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amount of US$950 from its fourth replenishment at climate change projects over the 
period 2006-2010. Combined together, the pledges and contributions from all these three 
funds and the GEF Trust Fund are well below US$1 billion a year. 
 
By contrast, according to the Stern Review (Stern, 2007), the incremental costs of low 
carbon investments in developing countries are likely to be at least US$20-30 billion a 
year. This is a very conservative estimate. The UNFCCC (2007) Secretariat puts the 
investment estimates for climate change adaptation in developing countries in the range 
of US$28-67 billion a year. On mitigation, the UNFCCC (2007) Secretariat estimates the 
investment of US$76 billion needed in developing countries a year.2 So, developing 
countries will need the investment of at least US$100 billion in climate change mitigation 
and adaptation. However, the contributions from all these three funds and the GEF Trust 
Fund only amount to less than one percent of the anticipated needs from developing 
countries. This suggests that the ratio of the combined pledged funding from the funds to 
the required investment at 1:100. 
 
 
Table 2  GEF Trust Fund Allocations and Co-financing in the Climate Change 
Focal Area 
 
GEF Phase GEF Grant 
(million US$) 
Co-financing 
(million US$ 
Pilot phase (1991-1994) 
GEF 1 (1994-1998) 
GEF 2 (1998-2002) 
GEF 3 (2002-2006) 
GEF 4 (2006-2010) 
      2007 
      2008 
      2009 
Total 
284.80 
510.36 
681.07 
877.72 
950.00 (targeted) 
76.35 
138.45 
88.26 
2657.01 
2402.89 
2322.10 
3403.40 
4810.56 
 
1651.82 
1119.46 
514.04 
16224.28 
 
Source: Global Environment Facility (2008b). 
 
 
The value of a single multilateral fund lies in its ability to leverage contributions from a 
range of other donors. Can these funds leverage co-financing from other sources to close 
this financing gap? Let us look at the recent record of leverage of multilateral funding. 
Since 1990, the World Bank Group commitments to renewable energy and efficiency 
have exceeded US$10 billion, with each dollar leveraging another three dollars from 
other private and public sources (Cundy, 2006). The GEF as an entity operating the 
financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, since its inception in 1991, has provided $8.26 
                                                 
2 The estimates vary. The World Bank (2006) estimates the incremental, upfront capital 
costs of US$30 billion per year to decarbonize the power sector in developing countries 
alone. 
 6
billion in grants and generated over $33.7 billion in co-financing from other sources to 
support over 2,200 projects that produce global environmental benefits in 165 developing 
countries and countries with economies in transition.3 As indicated in Table 2, in the 
focal area of climate change, as at November 2008, the GEF has allocated since its 
inception a total of US$2.66 billion from the GEF Trust Fund. This GEF funding has 
leveraged a co-financing in excess of US$16.22 billion. This suggests that the GEF 
enjoys an average leverage ratio of 4.1 in the all six focal areas and 6.1 in the climate 
change focal area, meaning that each dollar of the GEF grant leverages US$4.1-6.1 from 
other sources. Assuming the leverage ratio of 6 and the minimum requirement of US$100 
billion per year, then the current commitments are only able to bring the total finance 
value to US$7 billion and leave the financing gap of US$93 billion per year. To close this 
gap, we need to increase the multilateral funding and enhance its leverage ability. 
Assuming the leverage ratio of 10, which has not experienced over the long time horizon 
for multibillion public funding, and the minimum requirement of US$100 billion per year, 
then the multilateral funding needs to be increased to US$10 billion per year to meet 
developing country needs for climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
 
If the funding available under the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC remains at its 
current level and continues to rely mainly on voluntary contributions, it will not be 
sufficient to address the future financial flows estimated to be needed for climate change 
mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. If a success of the Montreal Protocol  
could be considered as some kind of predictor for a post-2012 climate regime, the 
combined pledged funding and contribution from the funds under the UNFCCC and the 
GEF and estimated funding from the fund under its KP are nowhere near to make trade 
measures work effectively, not to mention whether they can be incorporated in a post-
2012 climate regime in the first place. 
 
 
4. The findings of WTO Thai cigarette dispute and the Shrimp-Turtle dispute 
Before the contracting parties employ trade measures to fulfill health/environmental 
concerns, WTO case laws suggest that, in order for these measures to be justified under 
the environmental exceptions of GATT Article XX, the contracting parties should 
explore whether there are any alternatives to trade provisions that could be reasonably 
expected to fulfill the same function but are not inconsistent or less inconsistent with the 
relevant WTO provisions or a good-faith effort has been made to reach an agreement 
among the parties concerned. 
 
The GATT Thai cigarette dispute illustrates the former. Under Section 27 of the Tobacco 
Act of 1966, Thailand restricted imports of cigarettes and imposed a higher tax rate on 
imported cigarettes when they were allowed on the three occasions since 1966, namely in 
1968-70, 1976 and 1980. After consultations with Thailand failed to lead to a solution, 
the U.S. requested in 1990 the Dispute Settlement Panel to rule on the Thai action on the 
grounds that it was inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the General Agreement; was not 
                                                 
3 See “The About GEF” at the GEF web site at: 
http://www.thegef.org/interior.aspx?id=50 (accessed on November 14, 2008). 
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justified by the exception under Article XI:2(c), because cigarettes were not an 
agricultural or fisheries product in the meaning of Article XI:1; and was not justified 
under Article XX(b) because the restrictions were not necessary to protect human health, 
i.e. controlling the consumption of cigarettes did not require an import ban. The Dispute 
Settlement Panel ruled against Thailand. The Panel found that Thailand had acted 
inconsistently with Article XI:1 for having not granted import licenses over a long period 
of time. Recognizing that XI:2(c) allows exceptions for fisheries and agricultural 
products if the restrictions are necessary to enable governments to protect farmers and 
fishermen who, because of the perishability of their produce, often could not withhold 
excess supplies of the fresh product from the market, the Panel found that cigarettes were 
not “like” the fresh product as leaf tobacco and thus were not among the products eligible 
for import restrictions under Article XI:2(c). Moreover, the Panel acknowledged that 
Article XX(b) allowed contracting parties to give priority to human health over trade 
liberalization. The Panel held the view that the import restrictions imposed by Thailand 
could be considered to be “necessary” in terms of Article XX(b) only if there were no 
alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement, or less inconsistent with it, 
which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health policy 
objectives. However, the Panel found the Thai import restriction measure not necessary 
because Thailand could reasonably be expected to take strict, non-discriminatory 
labelling and ingredient disclosure regulations and to ban all the direct and indirect 
advertising, promotion and sponsorship of cigarettes to ensure the quality and reduce the 
quantity of cigarettes sold in Thailand. These alternative measures are considered WTO-
consistent to achieve the same health policy objectives as Thailand now pursues through 
an import ban on all cigarettes whatever their ingredients (GATT, 1990). 
  
The WTO Appellate Body decisions on the Shrimp-Turtle dispute, which have been 
interpreted as implicitly permitting trade measures pursued through multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs), illustrate the latter. To address the decline of sea 
turtles around the world, in 1989 the U.S. Congress enacted Section 609 of Public Law 
101-162 to authorize embargoes on shrimp harvested with commercial fishing technology 
harmful to sea turtles. The U.S. was challenged in the WTO by India, Malaysia, Pakistan 
and Thailand in October 1996, after embargoes were leveled against them. The four 
governments challenged this measure, asserting that the U.S. could not apply its laws to 
foreign process and production methods. A WTO Dispute Settlement Panel was 
established in April 1997 to hear the case. The Panel found that the U.S. failed to 
approach the complainant nations in serious multilateral negotiations before enforcing the 
U.S. law against those nations. The Panel held that the U.S. shrimp embargo was a class 
of measures of processes-and-production-methods type and had a serious threat to the 
multilateral trading system because it conditioned market access on the conservation 
policies of foreign countries. Thus, it cannot be justified under GATT Article XX. 
However, the WTO Appellate Body overruled the Panel’s reasoning. The Appellate Body 
held that a WTO member requires from exporting countries compliance, or adoption of, 
certain policies prescribed by the importing country does not render the measure 
inconsistent with the WTO obligation. Although the Appellate Body still found that the 
U.S. shrimp embargo was not justified under GATT Article XX, the decision was not on 
ground that the U.S. sea turtle law itself was not inconsistent with GATT. Rather, the 
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ruling was on ground that the application of the law constituted “arbitrary and 
unjustifiable discrimination” between WTO members (WTO, 1998). The WTO Appellate 
Body pointed to a 1996 regional agreement reached at the U.S. initiation, namely the 
Inter-American Convention on Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, as evidence 
of the feasibility of such an approach (WTO, 1998; Berger, 1999). Here, the Appellate 
Body again advanced the standing of multilateral environmental treaties (Zhang, 2004; 
Zhang and Assunção, 2004). Thus, it follows that this trade dispute under the WTO may 
have been interpreted as a clear preference for actions taken pursuant to multilateral 
agreements and/or negotiated through international cooperative arrangements, such as the 
Kyoto Protocol and its successor. However, this interpretation should be with great caution, 
because there is no doctrine of stare decisis (namely, “to stand by things decided”) in the 
WTO; the GATT/WTO panels are not bound by previous panel decisions (Zhang and 
Assunção, 2004). 
 
Moreover, the WTO Shrimp-Turtle dispute settlement may have a bearing on the ongoing 
discussion on the “comparability” of climate actions in a post-2012 climate change 
regime. The Appellate Body found that when the U.S. shifted its standard from requiring 
measures essentially the same as the U.S. measures to “the adoption of a program 
comparable in effectiveness”, this new standard would comply with the WTO disciplines. 
Some may view that this case opens the door for U.S. climate legislation that bases trade 
measures on an evaluation of the comparability of climate actions taken by other trading 
countries (Werksman and Houser, 2008). Comparable action can be interpreted as 
meaning action comparable in effect as the “comparable in effectiveness” in the Shrimp-
Turtle dispute. It can also be interpreted as meaning “the comparability of efforts”. The 
Bali Action Plan (BAP) adopts the latter interpretation, using the terms comparable as a 
means of ensuring that developed countries undertake commitments comparable to each 
other. But the BAP does not provide a clear definition. In the next section, we will 
discuss why there is a clear need to define comparable efforts towards climate mitigation 
and adaptation to discipline the use of unilateral trade measures at the international level.      
 
 
5. What can be taken from the MP and the findings of WTO Appellate Body in the 
Shrimp-Turtle dispute? 
The lesson from the MP suggests that trade measures can be incorporated in MEAs and 
work effectively in practice only if they are accompanied with effective financial and 
technology transfer mechanisms. However, just because the MP successfully uses trade 
measures to prompt broad participation and help compliance and enforcement does not 
necessarily mean that there is a potential for a post-2012 climate regime to do the same. 
So we need to be very careful in transplanting the MP experience into the UNFCCC 
context. Indeed, given that the scope of economic activities affected by a climate regime 
is several orders of magnitude larger than those covered by the MP, it is unlikely for 
industrialized countries to bear all the incremental costs of climate mitigation and 
adaptation in developing countries as they do in the MP case. Developing countries have 
well recognized this reality and are not expected for their costs to be fully borne by 
industrialized countries. However, if the combined pledged funding from the funds under 
the Climate Convention and its Kyoto Protocol and from its financial mechanism is 
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significantly far from the anticipated climate mitigation and adaptation needs from 
developing countries as it has been the case, it is safe to say that developing country 
parties are unlikely to agree to the inclusion of trade-related measures against them in a 
post-2012 climate regime in the first place.  
 
However, as part of the evolving climate regime, trade-related measures should, at the 
very least, be contemplated for a set of industrialized countries (Annex I or II countries). 
It should be specified how these measures will apply to non-complying parties within this 
group and when and how unilateral trade measures can be used against countries outside 
the group. On the one hand, current articles on climate-trade linkages under the UNFCCC 
and its Kyoto Protocol are too general to hardly be of practical use. On the other hand, 
the BAP calls for “comparability of efforts” towards climate mitigation actions only 
among industrialized countries. However, lack of the clearly defined notion on what is 
comparable has led to diverse interpretations of the concept of comparability. Moreover, 
there is no equivalent language in the BAP to ensure that developing country actions, 
whatever might be agreed at Copenhagen, that must also be comparable to those of 
developed countries. So, some industrialized countries have extended the scope of its 
application beyond industrialized countries themselves, attempting to impose unilateral 
trade measures against other trading partners to address its competitiveness concerns. 
Such lack of the common understanding will lead one country to define whether other 
countries have made comparative efforts to its own. This can hardly be objective, and in 
turn leads one country to misuse unilateral trade measures against other trading partners 
to address its competitiveness concerns. Therefore, there is a clear need to define 
comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and adaptation to discipline the use of 
unilateral trade measures at the international level, taking into account differences in their 
national circumstances, such as current level of development, per capita GDP, current 
and historical emissions, emission intensity, and per capita emissions. If well defined, 
that will provide some reference to WTO panels in examining cases related to 
comparability issues.  
 
As a hypothetical example, assume that a country imposes unilateral trade measures 
against its trading partners on the comparability ground but does so without following the 
internationally agreed notion. Its trading partners might choose to challenge that country 
before WTO. A case like this is likely, given that both the top Chinese official in charge 
of climate issue and the Brazilian lead climate ambassador consider the WTO as the 
proper forum when developing countries are required to purchase allowances in the 
proposed U.S. cap-and-trade regime (Samuelsohn, 2007). If a case like this really 
happens before a WTO panel, that panel would likely look to the UNFCCC for guidance 
on an appropriate standard for the comparability of climate to assess whether that country 
has followed the international standard when determining comparability. Otherwise, that 
WTO panel will have no choice but to fall back on the aforementioned Shrimp-Turtle 
jurisprudence, and would be influenced by the fear of the political fall out from 
overturning U.S. unilateral trade measures in its domestic climate legislation. If the U.S. 
measures were allowed to stand, that would undermine the UNFCCC’s legitimacy in 
setting and distributing climate commitments between its parties (Werksman and Houser, 
2008).  
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6. How far can developing country commitments go in an immediate post-2012 
climate regime?4 
The U.S. commitments at Kyoto and diplomatic and public pressure on China had put 
great pressure on China to take on some kind of commitments. Under these 
circumstances and in anticipation that the U.S. would take on more stringent 
commitments subsequent to the first compliance period (namely, far below its 1990 level), 
I envisioned a decade ago the following six proposals that could be put on the table as 
China’s plausible negotiation position, which is described in ascending order of stringency 
(Zhang, 2000).5 
 
“First, China could regard its active participation in CDM as ‘meaningful participation’. 
 
Second, just as Article 3.2 of the Kyoto Protocol requires Annex I countries to ‘have 
made demonstrable progress’ in achieving their commitments by 2005, China could 
commit to demonstrable efforts towards slowing its greenhouse gas emissions growth at 
some point between the first commitment period and 2020. Securing the undefined 
‘demonstrable progress’ regarding China’s efforts is the best option that China should 
fight for at the international climate change negotiations subsequent to Buenos Aires. 
 
Third, if the above commitment is not considered ‘meaningful’, China could make 
voluntary commitments to specific policies and measures to limit greenhouse gas 
emissions at some point between the first commitment period and 2020. Policies and 
measures might need to be developed to explicitly demonstrate whether or not China has 
made adequate efforts. Such policies and measures might include abolishing energy 
subsidies, improving the efficiency of energy use, promoting renewable energies, and 
increasing the R&D spending on developing environmentally sound coal technologies. 
 
Fourth, China could make a voluntary commitment to total energy consumption or total 
greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP at some point around or beyond 2020. In my 
view, carbon intensity of the economy is preferred to energy intensity of the economy 
(i.e., total energy consumption per unit of GDP), because all the efforts towards shifting 
away from high-carbon energy are awarded by the former… 
 
The fifth option would be for China to voluntarily commit to an emissions cap on a 
particular sector at some point around or beyond 2020. Taking on such a commitment, 
although already burdensome for China, could raise the concern about the carbon leakage 
from the sector to those sectors whose emissions are not capped. 
 
                                                 
4 This section draws heavily on Zhang (2000, 2008b and 2009a). 
5 Zhang (2000) was originally prepared for the United Nations Development Programme 
in 1998. When the draft of that paper was ready, the Washington DC-based Resources for 
the Future made a press release titled “Is China Taking Actions to Limit Its Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions?”, September 15, 1998. 
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This leads to the final option that China could offer: a combination of a targeted carbon 
intensity level with an emissions cap on a particular sector at some point around or 
beyond 2020. This is the bottom line: China cannot afford to go beyond it until its per 
capita income catches up with the level of middle-developed countries.” 
 
At that time, it looked like China would be pressured to take on commitments at a much 
earlier date than what China wished. This situation changed once the U.S. withdrew from 
the Kyoto Protocol. A decade later, we see that the ideas of commitments based on 
carbon intensity and sectoral approaches, which were discussed in the academic literature 
ten years ago, are formally incorporated into the Bali roadmap. This roadmap, which was 
agreed to at the UNFCCC Conference of Parties meeting in December 2007, sets out the 
course for developing post-2012 commitments, with a clear deadline for conclusion by 
2009. This is a very positive development, and clearly indicates the policy relevance of 
the once-sound-theoretical ideas. However, there is great doubt that developing countries 
will go beyond the aforementioned third option between 2013 and 2020 for several 
reasons. 
 
First, given the very short timeframe to conclude the negotiations, in all likelihood, it 
would be impossible to reach the necessary agreement on the rules, countries and sectors 
covered and the levels of ambitions for developing countries, especially due to the 
amount of the data that would be required. As it has been indicated by the Asian-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Summit in September 2007, setting a carbon 
intensity target, even if it is not binding, is not that easy. Australia, the host country, 
proposed that all 21 APEC economies, regardless of whether they are developed and 
developing economies, agree to reduce energy intensity by at least 25% by 2030, but in 
the end the leaders only agreed to work towards achieving an APEC-wide (emphasis 
added) aspirational goal in energy intensity by at least 25% by 2030, relative to 2005 
levels. This should not come as a surprise because energy use per unit of GDP, a key 
indicator of patterns of energy use, is still high in many developing Asian countries, and 
even increased in countries such as Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, South Korean and 
Thailand between 1990 and 2004. Indonesia and Pakistan consumed almost the same 
amount of energy per unit of GDP as they were in 1990 (Figure 1). Even the rate of 
energy efficiency improvement in IEA countries has been less than 1% per year since 
1990 – much lower than in the previous decades.  
 
Second, it is inconceivable that developing countries would ever go beyond the 
aforementioned third option between 2013 and 2020 without an effective financial 
mechanism. Market instruments like CDM, as useful as it may be, must be complemented 
with traditional fund solutions that provide a stable source of funding. However, the 
pledged funding from the funds under the Climate Convention and its Kyoto Protocol and 
from its financial mechanism are far from the anticipated needs from developing 
countries. Unless this funding situation changes significantly, which is most unlikely to 
happen, developing countries cannot afford to make commitments beyond the third 
option above-envisioned a decade ago. 
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Figure 1.  Energy use per unit of GDP in the selected Asia Pacific countries, 1990-2004 
(Tons of oil equivalent/million 2000 US$). 
Source: Zhang (2008a). 
 
 
Third, the U.S. factor will continue to play a role in affecting developing country’s 
willingness to take on commitments and the ambition of that commitments. The U.S. 
House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 
that would cut U.S. carbon emissions by 17% from 2005 levels by 2020 by a vote of 219-
212 on June 26, 2009. The debate would now move to the U.S. Senate that is expected to 
write its own version of a climate change bill, but its fate is uncertain this year. Even if 
the Senate’s bill had set the same emission target as the House’s bill, U.S. greenhouse gas 
emissions in 2020 would be still above their 1990 level, given the fact that U.S. GHG 
emissions were 16.8% higher in 2005 than that in 1990 (EIA, 2007), and not all emission 
sources are capped under the Act. From a U.S. perspective, that emission reduction 
would appear quite ambitious and require serious actions and investment, but is still far 
short of a 7% reduction of the U.S. GHG emissions during the period 2008-2012 required 
by the Kyoto Protocol and 25-40% by 2020 suggested by the IPCC and demanded by 
developing countries. In anticipation that the U.S. would take on the more stringent 
commitments subsequent to the first compliance period (namely, far below its 1990 level), 
I envisioned a decade ago that developing countries may go beyond the aforementioned 
third option. However, the U.S. emissions in 2020 are at best kept at their 1990 level. 
This is far from the point where it is likely that developing country would do that.  
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7. Encouraging developing countries to do more: carrots, sticks or both? 
Understandably, the U.S. and other industrialized countries would like to see developing 
countries, in particular large developing economies, go beyond that because of concerns 
about their own competitiveness and growing greenhouse gas emissions in developing 
countries. They are considering unilateral trade measures to “induce” developing 
countries to do so. WTO members have rights to do that because they are free to 
unilaterally decide what measures to take and under what conditions. But once they have 
made such a choice, then and only then the WTO rules apply. For example, a variety of 
measures have been put forward for the U.S. legislators to consider, falling into the three 
broad categories: border adjustment measures, performance standards and carbon market 
design (Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality of the U.S. House of Representatives, 
2008). To date, there is a considerable disagreement as to what measures would be most 
likely to pass muster under the WTO. Therefore, from the perspective of WTO 
consistency, industrialized countries need to focus on carrots, supported by sticks (e.g., 
border adjustment measures and similar trade-related measures, or conditions on access 
to carbon markets), as a means of encouraging developing countries to do more 
domestically than what are internationally agreed upon. The Montreal Protocol clearly 
demonstrates that an approach of a carrots (financial assistance and technology transfer) 
assisted with sticks (trade restrictions) approach works effectively in achieving its 
legitimate environmental objective.   
 
However, measures as proposed in the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008 
hold out more sticks than carrots to developing countries. A proposal by the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) and American Electric Power (AEP) would 
have required importers to obtain emission allowances to cover the carbon content of 
certain products from countries that do not take climate actions comparable to that of the 
U.S. (Morris and Hill, 2007). The original version of the bill had already incorporated 
this mechanism, threatening to punish energy-intensive imports from developing 
countries by requiring importers to obtain emission allowance, but only if they had not 
taken comparable actions by 2020, eight years after the effective start date of a U.S. cap-
and-trade regime begins. It was argued that the inclusion of trade provisions would give 
the U.S. additional diplomatic leverage to negotiate multilaterally and bilaterally with 
other countries on comparable climate actions. Should such negotiations not succeed, 
such trade provisions would provide a means of leveling the carbon playing field between 
American energy-intensive manufacturers and their competitors in countries not taking 
comparable climate actions. Not only would the bill have imposed an import allowance 
purchase requirement too quickly, it would have also dramatically expanded the scope of 
punishment: almost any manufactured product would potentially have qualified. If 
strictly implemented, such a provision would pose an insurmountable hurdle for 
developing countries (The Economist, 2008).  
 
It should be emphasized that the aim of including trade provisions is to facilitate 
negotiations while keeping open the possibility of invoking trade measures as a last resort. 
The latest version of the Lieberman-Warner bill has brought the deadline forward to 2014 
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to gain business and union backing.6 The inclusion of trade provisions might be 
considered the “price” of passage for any U.S. legislation capping its greenhouse gas 
emissions. Put another way, it is likely that no climate legislation can move through U.S. 
Congress without dealing with the issue of trade provisions. An important issue on the 
table is the length of the grace period to be granted to developing countries. While many 
factors need to be taken into consideration here (Haverkamp, 2008), further bringing 
forward the imposition of allowance requirements to imports is rather unrealistic, given 
the already very short grace period ending 2019 in its original version. It should be 
noticed that the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer grants 
developing countries a grace period of 10 years (Zhang, 2000). Given that the scope of 
economic activities affected by a climate regime is several orders of magnitude larger 
than those covered by the Montreal Protocol, if legislation incorporates border adjustment 
measures (put the issue of their WTO consistency aside), in my view, they should not be 
invoked at least 10 years after mandatory U.S. emission targets take effect.  
 
Moreover, unrealistically shortening the grace period granted before resorting to the trade 
provisions would increase uncertainty of whether the measure would withstand a 
challenge by U.S. trading partners before the WTO. As the ruling in the Shrimp-Turtle 
dispute indicates, for a trade measure to be considered WTO-consistent, a period of good-
faith efforts to reach agreements among the countries concerned is needed before 
imposing such trade measures. Put another way, trade provisions should be preceded by 
major efforts to negotiate with partners within a reasonable timeframe. Furthermore, 
developing countries need reasonable time to develop and operate national climate 
policies and measures. Take the establishment of an emissions trading scheme as a case 
in point. Even for the U.S. SO2 Allowance Trading Program, the entire process from the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency beginning to compile the data for its allocation 
database in 1989 to publishing its final allowance allocations in March 2003 took almost 
four years. For the first phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the entire process 
took almost two years from the EU publishing the Directive establishing a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading on 23 July 2003 to it approving the last 
national allocation plan for Greece on 20 June 2005. For developing countries with very 
weak environmental institutions and that do not have dependable data on emissions, fuel 
uses and outputs for installations, this allocation process is expected to take much longer 
than what experienced in the U.S. and the EU (Zhang, 2007b). 
 
In the case of a WTO dispute, the question will arise whether there are any alternatives to 
trade provisions that could be reasonably expected to fulfill the same function but are not 
inconsistent or less inconsistent with the relevant WTO provisions. In the GATT Thai 
cigarette dispute, the Dispute Settlement Panel concluded that Thailand had legitimate 
concerns with health but it had measures available to it other than a trade ban that would 
be consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (e.g. bans on advertising) 
(GATT, 1990). Indeed, there are alternatives to resorting to trade provisions to protect the 
                                                 
6 This is in line with the IBEW/AEP proposal, which requires U.S. importers to submit 
allowances to cover the emissions produced during the manufacturing of those goods two 
years after U.S. starts its trade-and-cap program (McBroom, 2008).  
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U.S. trade-sensitive, energy-intensive industries during a period when the U.S. is taking 
good-faith efforts to negotiate with trading partners on comparable actions. One way to 
address competitiveness concerns is to initially allocate free emission allowances to those 
sectors vulnerable to global competition, either totally or partially. Bovenberg and 
Goulder (2002) found that giving out about 13% of the allowances to fossil fuel suppliers 
freely instead of auctioning in an emissions trading scheme in the U.S. would be 
sufficient to prevent their profits with the emissions constraints from falling in 
comparison with those without the emissions constraints. 
 
There is no disagreement that the allocation of permits to emissions sources is a 
politically contentious issue. Grandfathering, at least partially grandfathering, helps these 
well-organized, politically highly-mobilized industries or sectors to save considerable 
expenditures and thus increases the political acceptability of an emissions trading scheme, 
although it leads to a higher economic cost than a policy where the allowances are fully 
auctioned.7 That explains why the sponsors of the American Clean Energy and Security 
Act of 2009 had to make a compromise amending it to auction only 15% of the emission 
permits instead of the initial proposal for auctioning all the emission permits in a 
proposed cap-and-trade regime in order for it to pass the U.S. House of Representatives 
Energy and Commerce Committee in May 2009. However, it should be pointed out that 
although grandfathering is thought of as giving implicit subsidies to these sectors, 
grandfathering is less trade-distorted than the exemptions from carbon taxes (Zhang, 
1998 and 1999), which means that partially grandfathering is even less trade-distorted 
than the exemptions from carbon taxes. To understand their difference, it is important to 
bear in mind that grandfathering itself also implies an opportunity cost for firms receiving 
permits: what matters here is not how firms get your permits, but what firms can sell 
them for - that is what determines opportunity cost. Thus, even if permits are awarded 
gratis, firms will value them at their market price. Accordingly, the prices of energy will 
adjust to reflect the increased scarcity of fossil fuels. This means that regardless of 
whether emissions permits are given out freely or are auctioned by the government, the 
effects on energy prices are expected to be the same, although the initial ownership of 
emissions permits differs among different allocation methods. As a result, relative prices 
of products will not be distorted relative to their pre-existing levels and switching of 
demands towards products of those firms whose permits are awarded gratis (the so-called 
                                                 
7 In a second-best setting with pre-existing distortionary taxes, if allowances are 
auctioned, the revenues generated can then be used to reduce pre-existing distortionary 
taxes, thus generating overall efficiency gains. Parry et al. (1999), for example, show that 
the costs of reducing U.S. carbon emissions by 10% in a second-best setting with pre-
existing labor taxes are five times more costly under a grandfathered carbon permits case 
than under an auctioned case. This is because the policy where the permits are auctioned 
raises revenues for the government that can be used to reduce pre-existing distortionary 
taxes. By contrast, in the former case, no revenue-recycling effect occurs, since no 
revenues are raised for the government. However, the policy produces the same tax-
interaction effect as under the latter case, which tends to reduce employment and 
investment and thus exacerbates the distortionary effects of pre-existing taxes (Zhang, 
1999). 
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substitution effect) will not be induced by grandfathering. This makes grandfathering 
different from the exemptions from carbon taxes. In the latter case, there exist 
substitution effects (Zhang, 1998 and 1999). For example, the Commission of the 
European Communities (CEC) proposal for a mixed carbon and energy tax8 provides for 
exemptions for the six energy-intensive industries (i.e., iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, 
chemicals, cement, glass, and pulp and paper) from coverage of the CEC tax on grounds 
of competitiveness. This not only reduces the effectiveness of the CEC tax in achieving 
its objective of reducing CO2 emissions, but also makes the industries, which are exempt 
from paying the CEC tax, improve their competitive position in relation to those 
industries which are not. Therefore, there will be some switching of demand towards the 
products of these energy-intensive industries, which is precisely the reaction that such a 
tax should avoid (Zhang, 1997). 
 
Moreover, to pass WTO scrutiny of trade provisions, the U.S. is likely to make reference 
to the health and environmental exceptions provided under GATT Article XX. This 
Article itself is the exceptions that authorize governments to employ otherwise GATT-
illegal measures when such measures are necessary to deal with certain enumerated 
public policy problems. The GATT panel in Tuna/Dolphin II concluded that Article XX 
does not preclude governments from pursuing environmental concerns outside their 
national territory, but such extra-jurisdictional application of domestic laws would be 
permitted only if aimed primarily (emphasis added) at having a conservation or 
protection effect (GATT, 1994; Zhang, 1998). The capacity of the planet’s atmosphere to 
absorb greenhouse gas emissions without adverse impacts is an ‘exhaustible natural 
resource’. Thus, if countries take measures on their own including extra-jurisdictional 
application primarily to prevent the depletion of this ‘exhaustible natural resource’, such 
measures will have a good justification under GATT Article XX. Along this reasoning, if 
the main objective of trade provisions is to protect the environment by requiring other 
countries to take actions comparable to that of the U.S., then mandating importers to 
purchase allowances from the designated special international reserve allowance pool to 
cover the carbon emissions associated with the manufacture of that product is debatable. 
To increase the prospects for a successful WTO defense, I think that trade provisions can 
refer to the designated special international reserve allowance pool, but may not do 
without adding “or equivalent”. This will allow importers to submit equivalent emission 
reduction units that are not necessarily allowances but are recognized by international 
treaties to cover the carbon contents of imported products. 
 
Besides the issue of WTO consistency, there will be methodological challenges in 
implementing trade provisions, although such practical implementation issues are 
                                                 
8 As part of its comprehensive strategy to control CO2 emissions and increase energy 
efficiency, a carbon/energy tax has been proposed by the CEC. The CEC proposal is that 
member states introduce a carbon/energy tax of US$ 3 per barrel oil equivalent in 1993, 
rising in real terms by US$ 1 a year to US$ 10 per barrel in 2000. After the year 2000 the 
tax rate will remain at US$ 10 per barrel at 1993 prices. The tax rates are allocated across 
fuels, with 50% based on carbon content and 50% on energy content (Zhang, 1997). 
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secondary concerns. Identifying the appropriate carbon contents embodied in traded 
products will present formidable technical difficulties, given the wide range of technologies 
in use around the world and very different energy resource endowments and consumption 
patterns among countries. In the absence of any information regarding the carbon content 
of the products from exporting countries, importing countries, the U.S. in this case, could 
adopt either of the two approaches to overcoming information challenge in practical 
implementation. One is to prescribe the tax rates for the imported product based on U.S. 
domestically predominant method of production for a like product, which sets the average 
embedded carbon content of a particular product (Zhang, 1998; Zhang and Assunção, 
2004). This practice is by no means without foundation. For example, the U.S. Secretary 
of the Treasury has adopted the approach in the tax on imported toxic chemicals under 
the Superfund Tax (GATT, 1987; Zhang, 1998). Alternative is to set the best available 
technology (BAT) as the reference technology level and then use the average embedded 
carbon content of a particular product produced with the BAT in applying BTA (Ismer 
and Neuhoff, 2007). To be more defensible, either of the approaches should allow foreign 
producers to challenge the carbon contents applied to their products to ensure that they 
will not pay for more than they have actually emitted. 
  
 
8. Conclusions 
Governments are taking great efforts to forge an agreement on comparable climate 
actions in the post-2012 climate negotiations. Aimed at leveling the carbon playing field, 
the inclusion of trade-related provisions is considered useful by some in both facilitating 
the adoption of such an agreement and effectively implementing it, once reached.   
 
To gain some guidance on the scope of trade provisions in a post-2012 climate change 
regime, this paper first describes the Montreal Protocol in which such trade provisions 
have been included. The lesson from the Montreal Protocol suggests that trade measures 
can be incorporated in multilateral environmental agreements and work effectively in 
practice only if they are accompanied with effective finance and technology transfer 
mechanisms. This lesson, combined with the fact the combined pledged funding from the 
funds under the Climate Convention and its Kyoto Protocol and from its financial 
mechanism is far from the anticipated climate mitigation and adaptation needs of 
developing countries, suggests that developing country parties are unlikely to agree the 
inclusion of trade-related measures against them in a post-2012 climate regime. 
 
In the meantime, the paper argues that trade-related measures should, at the very least, be 
contemplated for a set of industrialized countries (Annex I or II countries) as part of the 
evolving climate regime at least on two grounds. First, the Shrimp-Turtle dispute under 
the WTO may have been interpreted as a clear preference for actions taken pursuant to 
multilateral agreements and/or negotiated through international cooperative arrangements. 
Second, there is a clear need to define comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and 
adaptation to discipline the use of unilateral trade measures at the international level. The 
Bali Action Plan calls for “comparability of efforts” towards climate mitigation actions 
only among industrialized countries. However, some industrialized countries, if not all, 
are considering the term “comparable” as the standard by which to assess the efforts 
 18
made by all their trading partners in order to decide on whether to impose unilateral trade 
measures on them. This is not hypothetical. Rather, it is very real as the Lieberman-
Warner bill in the U.S. Senate demonstrated. While that bill died on the floor of the 
Senate, this is by no means the end of the prospect for border adjustment type of 
unilateral trade measures provision, given that the inclusion of such trade provisions 
might be considered the “price” for passing any U.S. legislation capping its greenhouse 
gas emissions. In addition to methodological challenges in implementing the Lieberman-
Warner type of border adjustment provision, the paper argues that that type of border 
adjustment provision is likely to face a WTO-consistency challenge. To increase the 
prospects for a successful WTO defense, there should be a period of good-faith efforts to 
reach agreements among the countries concerned before imposing such trade measures. 
Put another way, trade provisions should be preceded by major efforts to negotiate with 
partners within a reasonable timeframe. As the WTO panel’s findings of the GATT Thai 
cigarette dispute indicate, the WTO consistency also requires considering alternatives to 
trade provisions that could be reasonably expected to fulfill the same function but are not 
inconsistent or less inconsistent with the relevant WTO provisions. Moreover, the paper 
suggests that trade provisions can refer to the designated special international reserve 
allowance pool, but may not do without adding “or equivalent”. This will allow importers 
to submit equivalent emission reduction units that are recognized by international treaties 
to cover the carbon contents of imported products. 
 
It should be emphasized that the Lieberman-Warner type of border adjustment provision 
holds out more sticks than carrots to developing countries. If the U.S. and other 
industrialized countries really want to persuade developing countries to do more to 
combat climate change, they should first reflect why developing countries are unwilling 
to and cannot afford to go beyond the aforementioned third option in the first place. That 
will require industrialized countries to seriously consider developing countries’ legitimate 
demand that industrialized countries need to demonstrate that they have taken the lead in 
reducing their own greenhouse gas emissions, provide significant funding to support 
developing country’s climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts and to transfer 
low- or zero-carbon emission technologies at an affordable price to developing countries. 
Industrialized countries need to provide positive incentives to encourage developing 
countries to do more. Carrots should serve as the main means. Sticks can be incorporated, 
but only if they are credible and realistic and serve as a useful supplement to push 
developing countries to take actions or adopt policies and measures earlier than would 
otherwise have been the case. At a time when the world community is starting to 
negotiate a post-2012 climate regime, unrealistic border adjustment measures as 
exemplified in the Lieberman-Warner bill are counterproductive to help to reach such an 
agreement on comparable climate actions in the post-2012 climate negotiations.  
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